Focused on innovation frequency of durable complementary goods, this paper shows that interdependency of innovation decisions generically gives rise to coordination failure between the producers. More importantly, the coordination failure may arise in opposite directions: Not only may the producers delay introducing new products, they may also introduce new products faster than the social optimum. The possibility of hastened innovations is in contrast to the conclusion from the literature focused on the monopolistic setting. The results provide a caution for policy-makers, and on the other hand serve as benchmarks for future studies incorporating competition.
Introduction
Sequential innovations have been common for durable goods such as computers, digital cameras, mobile phones, and other digital products. A common feature of these products is that, because they are durable, the old models remain functional when upgraded products are available. In other words, their physical obsolescence is much slower than their technological I am very grateful for comments from Steve Dowrick, Richard Cornes, Scott McCracken and seminar participants at the University of Pennsylvania, the 28th Australasian Economic Theory Workshop, the 2010 Paci…c Rim Innovation Conference, and the Australian National University, and advice from Rafael Rob at the early stage of this project. An earlier version of this paper is titled "Dynamic Innovation of Durable Complementary Goods". All remaining errors are mine.
y Research School of Economics, College of Business and Economics, Australian National University; H W Arndt Building, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia; Email: yijuan.chen@anu.edu.au obsolescence. While sequential innovations allow a new product to be developed upon the quality of an old product, durability makes the consumers only willing to pay for the ‡ow of the new product's incremental quality, up to when the next new product is introduced. Consequently, as Fishman and Rob (2000) show, the producer cannot extract the full social value of a new product, and thus will innovate less frequently than the social optimum.
Following the previous study, policy-makers may consider adopting policies that encourage innovations. However, one factor that has been neglected by the previous study is that in reality many durable goods are made up of complementary components that are developed by independent producers. For example, a personal computer typically consists of a machine and an operating system. A video game device includes the console and the games. Mobile phone applications are often created by developers that are not associated with the handset producers. Because these kinds of goods are of value to the consumers only if consumed as a system, the producers'innovation decisions are necessarily interdependent. The literature leaves it as an open question how the strategic interactions between the producers will a¤ect the innovation frequency.
This paper shows that interdependency of innovation decisions may give rise to coordination failure between the producers of complementary durable goods. More importantly, the coordination failure may arise in opposite directions. That is, not only may the producers delay introducing new products, they may also introduce new products more frequently than the social optimum. The results on the one hand provide a caution to policy-makers who may want to increase innovation frequencies, and on the other hand serve as benchmarks for future studies on di¤erent market structures, especially those with competition.
Speci…cally, this paper considers a durable system that is made up of a hardware part and a software part, with each part being developed by an independent …rm. As the study is focused on innovation frequency, the quality of a new product is assumed to be determined by the length of the R&D process. The coordination failure with delayed introductions is analogous to standard "classroom" examples: In the extreme case, if the hardware producer never develops its product, it is best for the software producer not to develop its product either, and vice versa. More generally, the reason lies in the complementarity between the products. Because the consumers only value the system as a whole, a part alone generates no utility. Consequently neither …rm will introduce its product earlier than the other, because the earlier introducer can always be better o¤ by spending more time on its R&D process, increasing the product's quality and ultimately its pro…tability.
The coordination failure where innovations are more frequent than the social optimum stems from the discrepancy between the social planner's and the …rms'bene…ts and costs of lengthening the R&D processes. On the one hand, a longer R&D process implies a higher quality of the new product, and thus allows the producer to charge a higher price when the new product is for sale. This can be called as the time bene…t. On the other hand, a delayed introduction of the new product means a delayed realization of the pro…t, and thus a lower present value of the pro…t. This can be called as the time cost. Both the socially optimal innovation frequency and the market equilibrium frequencies can be characterized by weighing the corresponding marginal time bene…ts and marginal time costs. Compared with the social planner, each …rm has a lower marginal time bene…t and a higher marginal time cost. The lower marginal time bene…t results from the fact that, when lengthening the R&D process, a …rm can only increase the quality of its own product, but the social planner enhances the quality of the whole system. Meanwhile, to develop the system, the social planner needs to shoulder the implementation costs of both parts. In contrast, a …rm only incurs the implementation cost of its own product. Ceteris paribus, the lower the implementation cost, the higher the undiscounted pro…t from introducing the new product. As a result, the …rms incur higher marginal time costs than the social planner. The lower marginal time bene…t and the higher marginal time cost both drive the …rms to shorten their innovation durations.
This paper …rst studies a static setting where the durable system will be introduced only once and cannot be further upgraded. The study is then extended to a more realistic, dynamic setting which allows in…nite sequential innovations on the system. The static setting helps to identify two driving forces, product complementarity and marginal time bene…ts/costs, that give rise to coordination failures in opposite directions. In the dynamic setting, however, there exists a third driving force. As identi…ed by Fishman and Rob (2000) , because the products are durable, consumers are only willing to pay for the incremental quality of the new products. This driving force gives the …rms more incentives to delay introduction of new products, and thus it is not immediately clear whether in the dynamic setting the …rms may still innovate more frequently than the social planner. Intuitively, for introduction of new products to be more frequent than the social optimum, the discrepancies between the marginal time bene…ts/costs of the …rms and those of the social planner need to be su¢ ciently wide. However, since the social planner and the …rms are using the same technologies, the di¤erence between the …rms'and the social planner's marginal time bene…ts is held constant by the model. Hence, given a …rm's implementation cost, the other …rm's implementation cost has to be large enough so that the social planner's marginal time cost is su¢ ciently small. As this reasoning applies to each …rm, in a Markov perfect equilibrium, for the …rms to innovate more frequently than the social optimum, the sum of their implementation costs needs to be su¢ ciently large.
Related Literature To my knowledge, this is the …rst paper that studies innovation by accommodating both in…nite sequential innovation and product complementarity. Though the study is focused on a duo-monopoly setting and thus abstracts from competition, the results can be used as benchmarks for future studies incorporating competitive market structures. In this sense this paper is related to two strands of literature with competitive innovations. The …rst strand, including Hunt (2004) , O'Donoghue (1998), and O'Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998), is focused on in…nite-sequentially competitive innovations of non-durable substitute goods. 1 The second strand, such as Meniere (2007) and Scotchmer and Green (1990), among others, studies complementarity within …nite-period frameworks. 2 However, as this paper shows, results from a …nite-period framework do not necessarily carry through in an in…nite-horizon setting, which arguably suits better the study of sequential innovation. Bessen and Maskin (2006) study technology complementarity with in…nite-sequential innovations. The notion of "technology complementarity" substantially di¤ers from "product complementarity". With technology complementarity, the …rms are essentially producing substitutes, while complementarity refers to the situation where one …rm's innovation allows the other to partially free-ride on the former's technology. A leading example, as Bessen and Maskin (2006) suggests, is the case that Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet built on VisiCalc, and Microsoft's Excel built on Lotus. Their study, therefore, …ts di¤erent scenarios than the present paper does. On durable-good innovation, there is a strand of literature that is focused on planned obsolescence. Sellers may practice planned obsolescence by building a level of durability into their products (Bulow (1986) ). Alternatively, when there exist network externalities on the demand side, …rms may supersede the old models by introducing new and incompatible generations (Waldman (1993 (Waldman ( , 1996 , Choi (1994a)). As the examples at the beginning of this section suggest, this paper di¤ers from this strand of literature and is more suitable for products of which the old models remain functional after new models are introduced. Traced further back, there has been a long strand of literature on durable-good monopoly pricing since Coase (1972) . This paper, however, is focused on innovation. For a detailed discussion about the distinction between these two topics, see Fishman and Rob (2000) .
While many previous studies assume deterministic demands, researchers also show that, when demand is ex-ante uncertain (Chatterjee and Sugita (1990) ), or seasonal and expanding (Radas and Shugan (1998) ), sellers may delay introduction of new products until demand is su¢ ciently high. 3 These studies, however, assume new products are already available and thus abstract from the R&D processes. In addition, the result that coordination failure may arise in opposite directions reminds one of the contrast between "tragedy of commons" and "tragedy of anticommons". 4 In the context of commons, which tragedy may occur crucially depends on the existence of property rights. By contrast, in this paper, with …rms'property rights, namely their claims of pro…ts, in place, two distinct categories of coordination failure still exist.
In the rest of the paper, the model with the static setting is presented in Section 2, and the dynamic model is studied in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. Appendix 1 contains proofs of some lemmas and propositions, while Appendix 2 studies an extended model that is brie ‡y discussed at the end of Section 3.
Static Innovation
Consider a market of a potential durable system. The system will consist of a software part and a hardware part. There are two …rms i 2 fs; hg. Firm s will produce the software; …rm h will produce the hardware. Time is continuous. At time 0, Firm i will choose a gestation period t i ; after which it will introduce its product, and a price p i at which the product will be sold. 5 At t i , the quality of …rm i's product will be g(t i ). 6 When the product is introduced, the …rm incurs a …xed implementation cost F i , which represents the cost of translating knowledge into consumable products. Apart from F i , the marginal costs of producing the products are constant and normalized to be zero.
7 3 Other studies that suggest delayed introductions include, among others, Putsis (1993) , Dhebar (1994) and Kornish (2001) . But not all of them are based on economic equilibrium analysis. 4 See Cornes and Hirokawa (2007) for a detailed discussion of these two phenomenons and the related literature. 5 The price p i is assumed to be a "spot price" at which the new product will be sold to the consumers in a "take-it-or-leave-it" manner. This assumption encompasses di¤erent pricing schemes: As long as the consumers will buy the new product at a certain time at a certain price, there is always an equivalent discounted price p i at which the consumers will buy when the product is just introduced. 6 As the study is focused on innovation frequency, for simplicity and tractability, I assume that the g is only a function of t i . More generally, however, the new product's quality can be assumed as g(t i ; x i ), with x i being a ‡ow of (monetary) R&D expenditure spent over t i . While the analysis is tractable in a monopoly setting with the …rm choosing both t i and x i (see Fishman and Rob (2000) ), in the present set-up with two producers, the tractability will be hard to maintain without simplifying g. Nonetheless, the present assumption can be interpreted as assuming x i to be exogenous.
There is a continuum of identical, in…nitely lived consumers of measure 1. The consumers have unitary demands. If the software part is of quality g(t s ) and the hardware part has quality g(t h ), then a representative consumer's valuation of the system will be worth
per period, with 2 (0; 1). 8 Denote by r the common instantaneous interest rate.
, strictly concave, strictly increasing and bounded above by g. There exists a t such that g(t) = (F s + F h )r.
The …rst …ve conditions in Assumption 1 are fairly standard, while the last one, the existence of t, is needed to ensure that it is socially desirable to ever introduce the system.
With static innovation, the comparison between social and private incentives to innovate boils down to the comparison between the socially optimal timing and the …rms'equilibrium timing decisions.
Social Optimum
The social optimum is achieved if there is a pair of times (t
To derive the social optimum, …rst note that if a part is introduced earlier than the other, because the products are of value to the consumers only if consumed as a system, the social planner can increase the social welfare by spending more time in developing the earlier part. 
Lemma 1 There exists a socially optimal time t o which satis…es
8 It is worth noting that a common production function g(:) implies that if both …rms introduce the products at the same time t, then the consumer's valuation of the system will be just g(t). This not only simpli…es notation, but, more importantly, also facilitates comparison between the present study and the literature studying monopoly. Nevertheless, I can show that, as the proof of Lemma 6 in Appendix also suggests, the main results below remain valid even if we allow a heterogenous production function g i (:), Proof. Since g is bounded, G(t) ! 0 as t ! 1. So there exists some such that G(t) < G( ) for all t > . Since G is C 2 and [0; ] is compact, G attains a maximum on [0; ]. Since
the maximum is interior and satis…es the …rst order condition, which leads to (1).
In terms of social welfare, there is a bene…t as well as a cost of spending time in developing the system. The bene…t, obviously, is the enhanced quality of the products, whereas the cost is the delayed realization of the system's value. The left side of (1) re ‡ects the marginal social time bene…t, 9 while the right side indicates the marginal social time cost. The equation, therefore, characterizes the social optimum. Moreover, we can see that the higher the implementation costs, the lower the undiscounted social welfare, and thus the lower the marginal social time cost.
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In addition, since I assume no product upgrades in this section a socially optimal time
) will coincide with the optimal time chosen by a monopolist, who produces both the software and hardware parts.
Market Equilibrium
We now turn to the market equilibrium.
A strategy for …rm i consists of (i) a time t i at which the new product will be introduced, and (ii) a price p i at which the new product will be sold when it is introduced at t i .
A strategy for a consumer is the maximum price at which she is willing to buy …rm i's product when it is introduced at t i .
Given the strategy sets of the agents, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy pro…le where each agent's strategy maximizes its payo¤ given the strategies of other agents. I restrict the study to pure strategy equilibria, and denote …rm i's equilibrium strategy by (t i ; p i ).
For an arbitrary ((t s ; p s ); (t h ; p h )), because a software or a hardware alone is of no value to a consumer, the consumer will either buy the system as a whole or buy neither part. Moreover, the consumer will buy the system if and only if the present value of the prices she pays is no higher than the present value of the utility she derives from the system. That is,
9 When deriving the …rst order condition that leads to (1), on both sides of the equation there is e rt , which cancels out. Thus the left side of (1) only re ‡ects, but is not exactly equal to, the marginal social time bene…t. The same argument applies to the marginal social time cost. 10 Mathematically, this stems from the fact that g(t) r(F s + F h ) and the undiscounted social welfare
(F s + F h ) are equivalent functions, di¤ering only by the constant multiplier r.
Consider a …rm, say h. Given the consumer's strategy and an arbitrary choice of …rm s, (t s ; p s ), if …rm h chooses to introduce its product at t h , it will set the highest possible p h .
Thus (2) implies
Hence …rm h's pro…t, denoted by h ; can be expressed as
Similarly we can obtain an optimal pricing scheme and the corresponding pro…t function for …rm s.
Lemma 2
In equilibrium it must be that t s = t h .
Proof. Suppose there exists an equilibrium with t s > t h . By (3),
contradicting t h being a best response to t s . Therefore there exists no equilibrium with t s > t h : Similarly we can rule out the existence of an equilibrium with t h > t s .
The intuition of Lemma 2 is that, due to the complementarity between the products, neither …rm will introduce its product earlier than the other. Suppose, say, …rm s chooses t s . Then for any t h < t s , complementarity implies that the system will be of no value to the consumer until t s . Conditional on t h < t s , as (3) shows, …rm h can always be better o¤ by spending more time in developing its product, because on the one hand it enhances the product's quality and allows …rm h to charge a higher price, and on the other it reduces the discounted implementation cost.
Lemma 2, however, only shows a necessary condition for equilibrium. It is yet unknow which gestation periods can actually be supported in equilibrium. The following lemma addresses this by fully characterizing the set of equilibria.
Lemma 3 A strategy pro…le ((t s ; p s ); (t h ; p h )) constitutes a Nash equilibrium if and only if (i) t s = t h = t with t t maxft s ; t h ; tg, where t s satis…es
and t h satis…es
Proof. In Appendix.
Like the social planner, a …rm also faces the bene…t and the cost of lengthening its R&D process. Analogous to (1) in Lemma 1, the left side of (4) or (5) (4) and (5) with (1), we see that, given the same gestation period, each …rm has a lower marginal time bene…t and a higher marginal time cost than the social planner. The lower marginal time bene…t stems from the fact that, when lengthening the R&D process, a …rm can only increase the quality of its own product, but the social planner enhances the quality of the whole system. On the other hand, the social planner bears the implementation costs of both parts, whereas a …rm only incurs the implementation cost of its own product. Ceteris paribus, the lower the implementation cost, the higher the undiscounted pro…t from introducing the new product. Consequently, the …rms incur higher marginal time costs than the social planner. The lower marginal time bene…t and the higher marginal time cost both give the …rms incentives to introduce the product earlier than the social planner.
Because the marginal time bene…t decreases (g 00 < 0), and the marginal time cost increases (g 0 > 0) with the gestation period, a …rm's marginal time bene…t outweighs its marginal time cost for all t i < t i . In other words, t i in (4) or (5) characterizes the lower bound of the gestation periods at which the …rm is willing to introduce it product. The complementarity of the products, however, implies that the …rm's equilibrium timing also depends on the opponent's choice. Given the opponent choosing t i > t i , Lemma 2 implies that …rm i will choose t i no earlier than t i , while the fact that beyond t i the marginal time cost outweighs the marginal time bene…t means that …rm i will also choose t i no later than t i . As a result, choosing any t i = t i > t i can be supported in equilibrium.
To sum up, generically we can expect two opposite categories of equilibria: Those where the lower marginal time bene…ts and the higher marginal time costs drive the …rms to introduce the product earlier than the social optimum, and those where the strategic interdependency arising from the products' complementarity causes the …rms to introduce the system later than the social planner. The proposition below formalizes this argument.
So not only are there equilibria where …rms introduce the products later than the social optimum (t > t o ), there also exist equilibria where …rms introduce the products earlier than the social optimum (t 2 [t ; t o )).
Therefore, from Lemma 3, for t > t o , …rms introduce the products later than the social optimum, while for t 2 [maxft s ; t h ; tg; t o ); …rms introduce the products earlier than the social optimum.
Dynamic Innovation
Having studied the static setting, we can now move to the more realistic dynamic setting where …rms consecutively introduce their new products. In this section I extend the previous static framework to an in…nite-horizon continuous-time setup, speci…ed as follows. At time 0, …rm i independently chooses a gestation period with length t 1 i after which it will introduce the …rst generation of its product. The …rst generation of the system will be of perperiod utility [g(t
in dollar terms to the consumer. After the …rst generation of the system, …rm i will engage in developing the second generation of its product by choosing the length of a gestation period t 2 i for it, and similarly for later-generation products. The quality of the system is cumulative: If the system has been updated N times, then its perperiod quality will be
] in dollar terms. A …xed implementation cost F i has to be paid by …rm i before each new product is introduced. Everything else remains the same as in the previous section.
Social Optimum
A social optimum is attained if there exists an in…nite sequence of gestation periods f(t that maximizes the social welfare.
Suppose the quality of the current system is q. Using dynamic-programming methods, a social planner solves the following Bellman equation: 
De…ning e V (q) V (q)
Since the term in the …rst square brackets on the right side of (6) does not depend on the state variable q, e V (q) is also independent of q. Hence if a social optimum f(t n 
Lemma 4 There exists a social optimum where the software and the hardware are updated after a constant gestation period t d , with t d satisfying
12 To see this, suppose instead that t
Then by (7) we have
The inequality implies that the social planner can do strictly better by increasing the gestation period of the software, a contradiction. Similarly we can rule out the possibility that t
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1, and thus is omitted. But it is available upon request.
Market Equilibrium
A strategy of …rm i has two components: (i) an in…nite sequence of gestation periods ft
A strategy of the representative consumer speci…es, for each …rm's new product, the highest price she is willing to pay.
The consumer forms expectations about the …rms'gestation periods. Denote the expectations by t e s and t e h respectively. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium with rational expectations is a pure strategy pro…le where, given the other players' strategies, (i) …rm i maximizes its discounted pro…t, (ii) the consumer maximizes her discounted surplus and (iii) the consumer's expectation is ful…lled.
Suppose the consumer owns a system with quality q and there is a new system with incremental quality [g(t s )] [g(t h )] 
This implies that the …rms'pro…tability depends only on (i) the system's incremental quality based on q; and (ii) the consumer's expectations about the next generation of products. Hence, it is natural to restrict our attention to the Markov perfect equilibria where the …rms'strategies depend only on payo¤-relevant state variables q and (t e s ; t e h ). Now consider …rm h. Given q, suppose …rm s will introduce its new product after t s and sell it at p s , then …rm h will choose (t h ; p h ) to solve
If the consumer has expectations (t 
Substituting (12) into (11) we get
Since the term in the …rst square brackets does not depend on q, V h (q) is also independent of q. It then follows that
Analogously we can derive a value function V s (q) for …rm s which will also turns out to be independent of q. Therefore, we can further restrict our attention to the equilibria where each …rm i chooses a constant gestation period t i and a constant price p i ; 13 and consequently the consumer's expectations are also constant.
Lemma 5 If a market equilibrium exists, it must be that t s = t h .
Proof. In Appendix
Since in equilibrium the consumer's expectations are ful…lled by the …rms'gestation periods, an immediate corollary of the lemma above is Corollary 1 If a market equilibrium exists, it must be that t While the previous lemma only gives a necessary condition for equilibrium, the lemma below characterizes the set of equilibria that meets all of our restrictions. 13 Note that looking for equilibria where each …rm sets constant gestation period t i is natural based on V i (q) being independent of q. However, this does not imply p i has to be constant too. Indeed we can have equilibria where t i is constant while p i varies. Thus requiring p i be constant is only for ease of analysis.
14 The existence of a non-trivial equilibrium, where …rms introduce new products constantly, is guaranteed by Assumption 1: For t su¢ ciently large, all three conditions in Lemma 6 will be satis…ed. A trivial equilibrium, where no …rms ever introduce products, also exists. 
Corollary 2 If t is part of an equilibrium, then t > t can also be supported in equilibrium.
By Lemma 6 and Corollary 2, we can de…ne t to be the minimum length that can be supported as a gestation period in the market equilibrium. 15 The two driving forces that are identi…ed in the static setting still hold here: First, the complementarity between the products renders each …rm unwilling to introduce its product earlier than the other, and second, lower marginal time bene…ts and higher marginal time costs generate incentives for the …rms to innovate more frequently than the social planner. In the dynamic setting, however, there is a third driving force. As Fishman & Rob (2000) show in a monopolistic setting, with sequential innovations, the products'qualities are cumulative. So a new product increases the social value in two ways. First, the new product per se increases the consumers'utilities, and second it increases the base quality upon which the future products can be developed. However, because the goods are durable, consumers are only willing to pay for the ‡ow of the new product's incremental quality, up to when the next new product is introduced. Hence the producer cannot extract the second part of the new product's social value. Consequently, the producer innovates less frequently than the social optimum. In the current model, with qualities also being cumulative from sequential innovations and the products being durable, this driving force remains, reducing the …rms'incentives to introduce the new products.
With the third driving force in place, for the …rms to innovate more frequently than the social planner, intuitively the discrepancies between the marginal time bene…ts / costs of the …rms and those of the social planner need to be su¢ ciently wide. However, since the social planner and …rms use the same technologies, the di¤erence between the …rms'and the social planner's marginal time bene…ts is held constant by the model. Hence, for introduction of new products to be more frequent than the social optimum, the discrepancy should be wide enough at the cost side. In other words, given a …rm's implementation cost, the other …rm's implementation cost has to be large enough so that the social planner's marginal time cost is su¢ ciently small. As this reasoning applies to each …rm, it is equivalent to saying that, for the …rms to innovate more frequently than the social optimum, the sum of their implementation costs needs to be su¢ ciently large. On the other hand, similarly to the static setting, the …rst driving force, now reinforced by the third, give rise to the coordination failure where …rms introduce new products less frequently than the social optimum. The proposition below formalizes this argument.
Proposition 2 There exists a F > 0 such that for every (F s ; F h ) with F s + F h 2 ( F ; g r ); t < t d : For equilibria with t > t d , …rms introduce the products less frequently than the social optimum, whereas for t 2 [t ; t d ) …rms introduce the products more frequently than the social optimum.
Proof. For ease of notation, let e F = F s + F h : By Lemma 6, in a market equilibrium the gestation period t will satisfy (17) and the equilibrium prices (p s ; p h ) satisfy
Thus combining (16) and (17) (18) gives period. Then by continuity, for t su¢ ciently close to but less than t d , we can also construct an equilibrium with t being the equilibrium gestation period, and in such an equilibrium the …rms innovate more frequently than the social planner.
The following parametric example helps to illustrate the statement in Proposition 2 graphically . in this case. Below the cuto¤ level, as the discrepancy between the …rms' and the social planner's marginal time costs becomes smaller, in equilibrium …rms always innovate less frequently than the social planner. Above the cuto¤ level, as the …rms face higher marginal time costs than the social planner, there exist market equilibria where …rms innovate more frequently than the social planner. While the study so far has been focused on characterizing a set of coordination failure that has been neglected in literature, naturally one will ask the opposite question: What if the …rms do coordinate? When the …rms coordinate, they essentially form a monopoly that develops each generation of the whole system. Consequently, the comparison between the monopoly equilibrium and the market equilibrium, as summarized by Proposition 3 below, becomes relevant to regulation policies regarding a monopoly that produces complements. Proof. Suppose the consumer's current system has quality q. Given the consumer's expectation t e , the monopolist chooses t m that solves the following problem
Since the term in the …rst square brackets does not depend on q, V m (q) is also independent of q. Hence we have
Analogous to the proof of Lemma 1, t m exists and satis…es the …rst-order condition
Then, analogous to the proof of Proposition 2, we can show that, independent of (F s + F h ), t m satis…es (18) with strict inequality. Therefore t m can be supported as the gestation period in a market equilibrium. By continuity, every t that is less than but su¢ ciently close to t m can also be supported as the gestation period in a market equilibrium.
Comparing Proposition 3 with Proposition 2, we can see that, the independent …rms may innovate more frequently than the monopolist at any level of implementation costs, while they do so against the social planner only if the implementation costs are su¢ ciently high. To see this, note that the monopolist faces the same consumer behavior, namely only paying for the incremental quality of the new products, as the independent …rms do. Therefore the third driving force, as discussed before, that restricts the set of equilibria where …rms innovate more frequently than the social planner has the same impact on the monopolist and the independent …rms. On the other hand, like the social planner, the monopolist is developing the whole system, and thus faces a higher marginal time bene…t and a lower marginal time cost than the …rms. As a result, the independent …rms may innovate more frequently than the monopolist at all levels of implementation costs. 16 Example 1 (continued): As shown in Figure 1 , in contrast to t d , the gestation period t m in the monopoly equilibrium is higher than t for all level of implementations costs.
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While the study has been focused on innovation frequency, as characterized by Lemma 6, multiple equilibria exist in another dimension. That is, given any equilibrium gestation period, there exists a continuum of pricing schemes that can be supported in equilibrium. This multiplicity, however, is inherent with unitary demand. To obtain a sharper prediction of equilibrium prices, one may need a richer model. 18 Nonetheless, in the present model, a focal point in terms of equilibrium prices can be where each …rm's price is proportional to the weight, characterized by , of the new system's quality that is attributed to the …rm's new product. On the other hand, departing from the unitary-demand framework, in Appendix 2 I show that price indeterminacy goes away with a linear demand derived from a quadratic 16 Also note that, by Corollary 2, the monopoly equilibrium can also be part of the market equilibrium. Moreover, since a monopolist has the option to choose any gestation period in a market equilibrium, the gestation period in the monopoly equilibrium maximizes the …rms'joint pro…t. However, just like a "textbook" 2-player 2-action example, the existence of a Pareto dominating equilibrium is the very reason why researchers are concerned with coordination failure. Hence the (non-generic) pro…t-maximizing equilibrium should not lead one to dismiss the rest of the equilibria. 17 Moreover, the observation that t m > t d is consistent with the result in Fishman and Rob (2000). 18 For example, a richer model may include a retailer, who acquires the products from the …rms and sells the whole system to the consumers. The equilibrium prices then are the outcomes of the bargaining process between the …rms and the retailer. utility function of the consumers. However, the comparison between the social and the private incentives necessarily complicates.
Conclusion
In this paper I compare the social and the private incentives for R&D of durable complementary goods. When there are no upgrades of the products, the …rms'lower marginal time bene…ts and the higher marginal time costs lead to equilibria where the …rms introduce the products earlier than the social planner. When upgrades are allowed, if the implementation costs are su¢ ciently high, the …rms may innovate more frequently than the social optimum. These results are in contrast to those derived from the setting where the goods are developed by a single monopolist, and thus provide a caution for policy-makers.
The framework of in…nite sequential innovation and product complementarity provides a base for future studies that may incorporate market competition, and the results of this study serve as benchmarks. There is a particular advantage of focusing on innovation frequency in future studies: While many studies on competitive innovation are patent-policy oriented, as Denicolo (2008) argues, when dealing with the non-obviousness requirement in patent law, "economists are ill equipped" to address empirically veri…able characteristics of innovation. By contrast, innovation frequency is empirically measurable.
Toward incorporating competition, there are several directions to extend this study. First, one can study sequential innovation of a single system, with one part of the system being developed by a single …rm and the other part by competing …rms. For example, while Microsoft develops its Windows operating system on its own, competing web browsers, such as Firefox, Chrome, Netscape, and Microsoft's own IE, are developed by various …rms. Second, one can investigate the scenario with competing systems, with a single …rm producing one system, and others developing components of the other system. For instance, Apple designs the Mac computer system on its own, whereas a PC system typically has its components developed by di¤erent …rms. Third, each of the competing systems may have its major components developed by various …rms. For example, in the video game market, competition not only exists between console producers such as Sony and Nintendo, but also between game designers such as Electronic Arts and Blizzard. Certainly, research can be conducted even further by combining the above directions.
Appendix 1
Proof of Lemma 3 Proof. If part:
Suppose there exists (t ; p s ; p h ) that satis…es (i) and (ii).
First consider …rm h. Given t s = t , by Lemma 2, …rm h will restrict its choice to t h t . Then by (3), …rm h's pro…t function is
F h e rts p s ; which leads to
where
and (ii)
where the inequality comes from the de…nition of t h and the condition that t h > t , then for all t h > t we get
Together with Lemma 2, (21) implies that t h = t is the best response to t s = t . Similarly we can show that when t h = t ; …rm s's best response is t s = t . Therefore ((t s = t ; p s ); (t h = t ; p h )) constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Only if part:
Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium ((t s ; p s ); (t h ; p h )). By Lemma 2, it must be t s = t h . Let t s = t .
Toward a contradiction, suppose (ii) does not hold. First, if p i < F i , then …rm i can be better o¤ by choosing t i = 1, which gives it 0 pro…t, a contradiction. Secondly, if
, then the consumer will not buy the system, while if p s + p h < g(t ) r , both …rms can be better o¤ by slightly increasing their prices, again a contradiction. Now suppose (i) does not hold. First, if t < t, then p s + p h = g(t ) r < g(t) r = F s + F h , so at least one …rm makes negative pro…t and it can be better o¤ by choosing t i = 1, a contradiction. Secondly, suppose t < t h . Given t s = t , we have
which implies that choosing t h = t is not …rm h's best response to t s = t , again a contradiction. Therefore t t h . Similarly we can show that t t s . Therefore (i) and (ii) must hold if ((t s ; p s ); (t h ; p h )) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Suppose there is an equilibrium with t s 6 = t h . Suppose t s > t h , then by (13) we have contradicting t h being a best response. Similarly we can rule out the possibility that t s < t h . Therefore if an equilibrium exists, then it must be t s = t h Proof of Lemma 6 Below I prove a more general statement where the …rms have di¤erent production functions g s and g h . Lemma 6 is then an immediate corollary.
First, without substantial changes, Assumption 1 is modi…ed as below. 
Proof. (If part)
Suppose there is a strategy pro…le f(t s ; p s ); (t h ; p h )g that satis…es (i) (ii) and (iii). It is su¢ cient to show that choosing t i = t is the best response of …rm i if the other …rm sets its gestation period to be t .
First consider …rm h. If …rm s sets t s = t , by Lemma 6 and condition (i), (13) can be rewritten as
where we let 
(1 e rt h ) 2 > 0,
Di¤erentiatingH h (t h ) with respect to t h > t , we have
Next, by condition (ii), at t h = t we have
The last inequality together with (23) then implies that setting t h = t is …rm h's best response.
Symmetrically we can show that if …rm h sets t h = t , then …rm s's best response is to choose t s = t . The proof exactly parallels the above steps, and is thus skipped.
Therefore , then the consumer will not buy the system and the …rms will make a loss, a contradiction. If
, then at least one …rm will deviate by setting a slightly higher price, another contradiction. Now suppose (ii) does not hold. Suppose we have
then we get
which implies …rm h can be better o¤ by setting a gestation period slightly higher than t , a contradiction. Similarly, we can show that it must be that
Therefore, condition (i) (ii) and (iii) must hold.
Proof of Corollary 2 Proof. Suppose t is part of an equilibrium. It is su¢ cient to show that t > t satis…es Condition (ii) in Lemma 6. To prove this, it is su¢ cient to show that the left sides of the inequalities in Condition (ii) of Lemma 6 are strictly decreasing at t = t . Let
1 e rt r > 0, and r (F s + e rt p h ) > 0, it must be that
We have 
(1 e rt )(2 e rt ) < 0 at t = t :
We have, at t = t ,
< 0 parallels the above steps, and is thus skipped.
A strategy for …rm i is (i) A time t i at which the new product will be introduced, and (ii) A price p i at which the new product will be sold when it is introduced at t i :
A strategy for the consumer is the quantity q i of …rm i's product she will buy when it is introduced at t i and sold at p i .
Given the strategy sets of the agents, a market equilibrium is a strategy pro…le where each agent's strategy maximizes her (discounted) payo¤ given the strategies of other agents. Again I restrict the study to pure strategy equilibria.
Denote …rm i's equilibrium strategy by (t
To characterize the equilibrium set, I …rst construct the demand function from the consumer's utility maximization problem. Given the demand function we can derive the equilibrium prices as functions of the …rms' timing decisions. Then we can characterize a necessary and su¢ cient condition for an equilibrium.
Given a …rm-strategy pro…le f(t s ; p s ); (t h ; p h )g, the consumer will choose (q While the above lemma only gives a necessary condition for a pure strategy equilibrium, the proposition below characterizes the set of pure strategy market equilibrium. h ; q ? ), it remains to characterize the equilibrium timing. The rest of the proof follows closely that of Lemma 3, and is thus omitted. But it is available upon request.
As shown in the proposition, associated with every equilibrium timing, there is a unique equilibrium price, suggesting that the property of the multiple equilibrium prices in the previous sections is not a consequence of the equilibrium concept that I use.
Based on the outcomes from the unitary demand setting, it is natural to expect a clear-cut result when comparing the market equilibrium with the social optimum in the current setting, the discussion below, however, shows that such a result does not hold in general.
For simplicity, assume that 2 [ The "ideal"result will be t ? < t l , which then implies that there exist market equilibria where the …rms introduce the products earlier than the socially optimal time. However, this can not be obtained: When ! 1, there will be t ? > t l , so that every market equilibrium has the system introduced too late. The example below shows the opposite case where t ? < t l19 : , there is t ? < t l .
